整理雨霏

编辑庄泽

编者按：北京时间2025年2月22日晚，伯克希尔哈撒韦发布巴菲特2025年致股东的信。伯克希尔至今创造了60年的奇迹，但正如巴菲特在这封信中所说这个成功，是源于收购伯克希尔的错误，但巴菲特和芒格及时纠偏并没有吮吸手指不作为。据信中提及内容，或是巴菲特最后一次写伯克希尔致股东的信，接下来将交给接班人阿吉特来撰写。这封信一如既往地延续了巴式的幽默风格。

下为这封信中英文对照全文。

巴菲特 2025 年致股东的信：

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

这封信是伯克希尔年度报告的一部分。作为一家上市公司，我们需要定期向你们披露许多具体的事实和数据。

This letter comes to you as part of Berkshire’s annual report. As a public company, we are required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures.

然而，“报告” 一词意味着更大的责任。除了规定的数据外，我们认为还应该向你们提供关于你们所拥有的资产以及我们的想法的额外评论。我们的目标是以一种换位思考的方式与你们沟通 —— 也就是说，如果你们是伯克希尔的首席执行官，而我和我的家人是被动投资者，将我们的积蓄托付给你们，我们希望你们也能以这样的方式与我们交流。

“Report,” however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we believe we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is to communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were reversed – that is, if you were Berkshire’s CEO while I and my family were passive investors, trusting you with our savings.

这种方式使我们每年都会讲述你们通过持有伯克希尔股票间接拥有的众多企业的发展情况，包括好的和坏的方面。不过，在讨论特定子公司的问题时，我们会遵循汤姆・墨菲 60 年前给我的建议：“表扬要指名道姓，批评则应笼统概括”。

This approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the many businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares. When discussing problems at specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60 years ago: “praise by name, criticize by category.”

错误 —— 没错，伯克希尔也会犯错

Mistakes – Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire

有时，我在评估伯克希尔收购的企业的未来经济前景时会犯错，这都是资本配置不当的例子。无论是对可交易股票的判断（我们将这些视为企业的部分所有权），还是对公司的全资收购，都可能出现这种情况。

Sometimes I’ve made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I’ve purchased for Berkshire – each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both judgments about marketable equities – we view these as partial ownership of businesses – and the 100% acquisitions of companies.

其他时候，我在评估伯克希尔聘请的管理人员的能力或忠诚度时也会犯错。忠诚度方面的失望带来的伤害可能不止于财务影响，那种痛苦堪比婚姻破裂。

At other times, I’ve made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the managers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial impact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage.

在人事决策上，能有一个不错的成功率就已经很不错了。最严重的错误是拖延纠正错误，或者像查理・芒格所说的 “犹豫不决”。他常对我说，问题不会凭空消失，需要采取行动，尽管这可能让人不太舒服。

A decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal sin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called “thumb-sucking.” Problems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away. They require action, however uncomfortable that may be.

在 2019 - 2023 年期间，我在给你们的信中使用了 16 次 “错误” 或 “失误” 这个词。许多其他大型公司在这期间从未使用过这两个词。我得承认，亚马逊在 2021 年的信中做了一些非常坦诚的自我剖析。在其他地方，通常都是一片乐观的言论和画面。

During the 2019 - 23 period, I have used the words “mistake” or “error” 16 times in my letters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon, I should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it has generally been happy talk and pictures.

我也曾担任大型上市公司的董事，在这些公司的董事会会议或分析师电话会议上，“错误” 或 “失误” 是禁忌词汇。这种禁忌暗示着管理层的完美，这总是让我感到不安（不过，有时可能存在法律问题，使得有限的讨论更为明智。我们生活在一个诉讼频发的社会）。

I have also been a director of large public companies at which “mistake” or “wrong” were forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection, always made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited discussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.)

我现在94岁了，格雷格·阿贝尔很快就会接替我成为首席执行官，并撰写年度信件。格雷格认同伯克希尔的信条，即一份“报告”是伯克希尔首席执行官每年对股东应尽的义务。他也明白，如果你开始欺骗股东，很快你就会相信自己的鬼话，进而欺骗自己。

At 94, it won’t be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the annual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a “report” is what a Berkshire CEO annually owes to owners. And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will soon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well. #

皮特·利格尔——独一无二的人才

Pete Liegl – One of a Kind

让我给你们讲一讲皮特·利格尔的非凡故事。大多数伯克希尔股东都不认识他，但他为股东们的总财富贡献了数十亿美元。皮特于11月去世，享年80岁，直到去世他仍在工作。

Let me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most Berkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete died in November, still working at 80.

我第一次听说森林河公司（Forest River）是在2005年6月21日。这家位于印第安纳州的公司由皮特创立并管理，是一家休闲车（RV）制造商。那天，我收到一位中间人来信，详细介绍了该公司的相关数据。写信人说，森林河公司的唯一所有者皮特别希望将公司卖给伯克希尔。他还告诉了我皮特期望的售价。我喜欢这种直截了当的方式。

I first heard of Forest River – the Indiana company Pete founded and managed – on June 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about the company, a recreational vehicle (“RV”) manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100% owner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete expected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach.

我向一些休闲车经销商做了些调查，对了解到的情况很满意，于是安排了6月28日在奥马哈会面。皮特带着他的妻子莎伦和女儿丽莎一起来了。见面时，皮特向我保证，他想继续经营这家企业，但如果能确保家人的财务安全，他会更安心。

I did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28th meeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa. When we met, Pete assured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he could assure financial security for his family.

皮特接着提到，他拥有一些出租给森林河公司的房地产，这在6月21日的信中并未提及。几分钟内，我们就确定了这些资产的价格，因为我表示伯克希尔无需进行评估，我会直接接受他的估值。

Pete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and had not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those assets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation.

然后我们谈到了另一个需要明确的问题。我问皮特他的薪酬应该是多少，并补充说，无论他说多少，我都会接受。（我得补充一句，这不是我推荐普遍使用的方法。）

Then we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation should be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I recommend for general use.)

皮特停顿了一下，他的妻子、女儿和我都倾身向前。然后他让我们大吃一惊：“嗯，我看了伯克希尔的委托书，我不想挣得比我的老板还多，所以给我年薪10万美元吧。” 我惊讶得差点从椅子上掉下来，这时皮特又说：“但我们今年会赚到X（他说了一个数字），我希望每年能从公司超出目前业绩的收益中获得10%的奖金。” 我回答说：“好的，皮特，但如果森林河公司进行任何重大收购，我们会根据所使用的额外资本进行适当调整。” 我没有定义 “适当” 或 “重大” 的含义，但这些模糊的表述从未引发过问题。

Pete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward. Then he surprised us: “Well, I looked at Berkshire’s proxy statement and I wouldn’t want to make more than my boss, so pay me $100,000 per year.” After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: “But we will earn X (he named a number) this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what the company is now delivering.” I replied: “OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant acquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed.” I didn’t define “appropriate” or “significant,” but those vague terms never caused a problem.

随后，我们四人去奥马哈的快乐山谷俱乐部共进晚餐，之后一直合作得很愉快。在接下来的19年里，皮特表现出色，没有竞争对手能与他的业绩相媲美。

The four of us then went to dinner at Omaha’s Happy Hollow Club and lived happily ever after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his performance.

并非每家公司都有易于理解的业务，也很少有像皮特这样的所有者或管理者。当然，我在评估伯克希尔收购的业务时也会犯错，有时在评估合作对象时也会失误。

Every company doesn’t have an easy-to-understand business and there are very few owners or managers like Pete. And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the businesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I’m dealing.

但我也在业务潜力以及管理者的能力和忠诚度方面收获了许多惊喜。我们的经验是，一个成功的决策随着时间推移能带来惊人的改变。（想想收购政府雇员保险公司（GEICO）这个商业决策，选择阿吉特·贾恩作为管理者的决策，还有我幸运地找到查理·芒格这位独一无二的合作伙伴、私人顾问和忠实朋友。）错误会逐渐淡化，而成功的决策会不断开花结果。

But I’ve also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as the ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can make a breathtaking difference over time. (Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a managerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one-of-a-kind partner, personal advisor and steadfast friend.) Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom.

在选择首席执行官方面，我还有一点要补充：我从不看候选人的毕业院校。从不！One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to school. Never!

当然，有很多优秀的管理者毕业于名校。但也有很多像皮特这样的人，他们可能受益于就读不太知名的院校，甚至没有完成学业。看看我的朋友比尔·盖茨，他认为在一个正在改变世界的新兴行业中起步，远比为了一张能挂在墙上的文凭留在学校重要得多。（读一读他的新书《源代码》。）

Of course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are plenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even by not bothering to finish school. Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more important to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to stick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall. (Read his new book, Source Code.)

不久前，我通过电话结识了杰西卡·图恩克尔，她的继父本·罗斯纳曾长期为查理和我经营一家企业。本是一位零售天才，在准备这份报告时，我向杰西卡确认本的学历，我记得他学历有限。杰西卡回复说：“本只读到六年级。”

Not long ago, I met – by phone – Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner, long ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this report, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben’s schooling, which I remembered as limited. Jessica’s reply: “Ben never went past 6th grade.”

我很幸运能在三所优秀的大学接受教育。我坚信终身学习。然而，我观察到，很大一部分商业才能是天生的，先天因素比后天培养更重要。

I was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in lifelong learning. I’ve observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate with nature swamping nurture.

皮特·利格尔就是一个天生的商业奇才。

Pete Liegl was a natural.

去年的业绩

Last Year’s Performance

2024 年，伯克希尔的表现超出了我的预期，尽管我们 189 家运营公司中有 53% 的公司收益出现了下降。由于美国国债收益率提高，且我们大幅增加了对这些高流动性短期证券的持有量，投资收益实现了大幅增长，这对我们起到了推动作用。

In 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating businesses reported a decline in earnings. We were aided by a predictable large gain in investment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings of these highly-liquid short-term securities.

我们的保险业务收益也大幅增长，这主要得益于政府雇员保险公司（GEICO）的出色表现。在过去五年里，托德・库姆斯对 GEICO 进行了重大改革，提高了效率，并使承保业务与时俱进。GEICO 是一颗长期持有的 “宝石”，需要大力打磨，而托德一直在不懈努力完成这项工作。虽然改革尚未完成，但 2024 年取得的进展非常显著。

Our insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the performance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way, increasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held gem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done. Though not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular.

总体而言，2024 年财产意外险（“P/C”）的定价有所提高，这反映出对流风暴造成的损失大幅增加。气候变化的影响可能已经显现。然而，2024 年并未发生 “灾难性” 事件。但总有一天，可能随时会发生极其严重的保险损失，而且无法保证每年只会发生一次。

In general, property-casualty (“P/C”) insurance pricing strengthened during 2024, reflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been announcing its arrival. However, no “monster” event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a truly staggering insurance loss will occur – and there is no guarantee that there will be only one per annum.

财产意外险业务对伯克希尔至关重要，本信件后面将对其进行更深入的讨论。

The P/C business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that appears later in this letter.

伯克希尔的铁路和公用事业业务，这是我们除保险业务外最大的两个业务板块，其总收益有所改善。不过，这两个业务仍有很大的提升空间。

Berkshire’s railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of insurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish.

在去年年底，我们以约 39 亿美元的价格将公用事业业务的持股比例从约 92% 提高到了 100%，其中 29 亿美元以现金支付，其余部分以伯克希尔 “B” 股支付。

Late in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to 100% at a cost of roughly $3.9 billion, of which $2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in Berkshire “B” shares.

总体而言，我们在 2024 年实现了 474 亿美元的运营收益。我们经常（可能有些读者会厌烦地说 “没完没了”）强调这一指标，而不是第 K - 68 页上按照通用会计准则（GAAP）规定报告的收益。

All told, we recorded operating earnings of $47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly – endlessly, some readers may groan – emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that are reported on page K-68.

我们的衡量指标不包括我们持有的股票和债券的资本利得或损失，无论这些利得或损失是否实现。从长期来看，我们认为收益很可能占上风（不然我们为什么要购买这些证券呢？），尽管每年的数据会有大幅波动且难以预测。我们进行此类投资的期限几乎总是远远超过一年。在很多情况下，我们的投资决策考虑的是几十年的时间跨度。这些长期投资有时会带来丰厚的回报。

Our measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether realized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail – why else would we buy these securities? – though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and unpredictably. Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year. In many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes make the cash register ring like church bells.

以下是我们对 2023 - 2024 年收益的详细分析。所有计算均扣除了折旧、摊销和所得税。息税折旧摊销前利润（EBITDA）是华尔街偏爱的一个指标，但存在缺陷，我们并不采用。

Here’s a breakdown of the 2023 - 2024 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after depreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for us.

令人惊讶！一项重要的美国记录被打破

Surprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed

六十年前，现任管理层接手了伯克希尔。这一举措是个错误 —— 是我的错误，它困扰了我们二十年。我要强调的是，查理立刻就发现了我这个明显的错误：虽然我收购伯克希尔的价格看起来很便宜，但它的业务 —— 一家位于美国北部的大型纺织企业 —— 正走向衰落。

Sixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a mistake – my mistake – and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize, spotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its business – a large northern textile operation – was headed for extinction.

美国财政部在某种程度上已经提前察觉到了伯克希尔的命运。1965 年，该公司一分钱的所得税都未缴纳，这种情况在公司已持续了大约十年，这实在令人尴尬。对于那些极具魅力的初创公司来说，这种经济表现或许可以理解，但对于一家美国工业的老牌支柱企业而言，这就像是一个闪烁的黄灯，警示着问题的存在。伯克希尔正走向衰落。

The U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire’s destiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had generally prevailed at the company for a decade. That sort of economic behavior may be understandable for glamorous startups, but it’s a blinking yellow light when it happens at a venerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can.

六十年后的今天，想象一下当美国财政部发现，还是这家公司 —— 仍以伯克希尔哈撒韦的名义运营 —— 缴纳的公司所得税比美国政府从任何其他公司（甚至是那些市值高达数万亿美元的美国科技巨头）收到的都要多时，他们会有多惊讶。

Fast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same company – still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway – paid far more in corporate income tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company – even the American tech titans that commanded market values in the trillions.

确切地说，伯克希尔去年向美国国税局（IRS）缴纳了四笔税款，总计 268 亿美元。这约占美国企业总纳税额的 5%。（此外，我们还向外国政府和 44 个州缴纳了相当数额的所得税。）

To be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled $26.8 billion. That’s about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. (In addition, we paid sizable amounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.)

请注意，实现这一创纪录纳税额的一个关键因素是：在1965 - 2024年期间，伯克希尔股东仅收到过一次现金股息。1967年1月3日，我们进行了唯一一次股息支付 —— 总额为101,755美元，即每股A类股支付10美分。（我都记不起来为什么会向伯克希尔董事会提议这一举措了。现在回想起来，就像一场噩梦。）

Note one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders during the same 1965 - 2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we disbursed our sole payment – $101,755 or 10¢ per A share. (I can’t remember why I suggested this action to Berkshire’s board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.)

六十年来，伯克希尔股东支持持续再投资，这使得公司的应税收入不断增加。向美国财政部支付的现金所得税在最初十年微乎其微，如今累计已超过 1010 亿美元，而且这个数字还在不断增加。

For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that enabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S. Treasury, miniscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than $101 billion . . . and counting.

庞大的数字可能让人难以直观理解。让我换个方式来描述我们去年支付的268亿美元。

Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the $26.8 billion that we paid last year.

如果在 2024 年全年，伯克希尔每 20 分钟就向美国财政部开出一张 100 万美元的支票（想象一下，2024 年是闰年，全年有 366 个日日夜夜），到年底我们仍会欠联邦政府一大笔钱。实际上，要到 1 月下旬，美国财政部才会告诉我们可以稍作喘息，睡上一觉，然后准备 2025 年的纳税事宜。

If Berkshire had sent the Treasury a $1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of 2024 – visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year – we still would have owed the federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before the Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our 2025 tax payments.

你的钱都投在哪里了

Where Your Money Is

伯克希尔的股权投资活动具有两面性。一方面，我们控制着许多企业，至少持有被投资公司 80% 的股份，通常情况下我们持有 100% 的股份。这 189 家子公司与可交易普通股有相似之处，但又不尽相同。这些子公司的总价值高达数千亿美元，其中包括一些罕见的 “瑰宝”，许多表现良好但远称不上卓越的企业，还有一些令人失望的落后者。我们没有投资会造成重大拖累的业务，但也有一些是我本不该收购的。

Berkshire’s equity activity is ambidextrous. In one hand we own control of many businesses, holding at least 80% of the investee’s shares. Generally, we own 100%. These 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from identical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems, many good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments. We own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased.

另一方面，我们持有十几家大型高盈利企业的少量股份，这些企业家喻户晓，如苹果、美国运通、可口可乐和穆迪等。这些公司中的许多企业在运营所需的有形净资产上获得了极高的回报率。截至年底，我们的部分持股价值为 272 亿美元。可以理解的是，真正出色的企业很少会整体出售，但这些 “瑰宝” 的一小部分股份在周一至周五可以在华尔街买到，而且偶尔还能以优惠的价格购得。

In the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly profitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola and Moody’s. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for their operations. At yearend, our partial-ownership holdings were valued at $272 billion. Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small fractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very occasionally, they sell at bargain prices.

我们在选择股权工具时不偏袒任何一方，根据哪里能更好地配置你们（以及我家人）的储蓄来进行投资。通常情况下，没有什么投资看起来很有吸引力；极少数情况下，我们会发现自己面临众多投资机会。格雷格和查理一样，在这种时候都能果断行动。

We are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon where we can best deploy your (and my family’s) savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very infrequently we find ourselves knee-deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to act at such times as did Charlie.

对于可交易股票，如果我犯了错误，调整起来相对容易。需要强调的是，伯克希尔目前的规模削弱了这一宝贵的选择灵活性。我们不能随意进出市场。有时，建立或退出一项投资需要一年或更长时间。此外，作为少数股东，我们无法在需要时更换管理层，也无法在对资金使用决策不满意时控制资金流向。

With marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake. Berkshire’s present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can’t come and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an investment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can’t change management if that action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the decisions being made.

对于控股公司，我们可以决定这些决策，但在处理错误投资时，灵活性要小得多。实际上，除非面临我们认为无法解决的问题，否则伯克希尔几乎从不出售控股企业。不过，有些企业主因为我们的坚定态度而选择与伯克希尔合作。偶尔，这对我们来说是一个明显的优势。

With controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility in the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses unless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners seek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for us.

尽管一些评论人士认为伯克希尔目前持有大量现金，但你们的大部分资金仍然投资于股票。这种偏好不会改变。虽然我们去年持有的可交易股票价值从354亿美元降至272亿美元，但我们非上市控股股票的价值有所增加，并且仍然远远高于可交易股票投资组合的价值。

Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at Berkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won’t change. While our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from $354 billion to $272 billion, the value of our non-quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far greater than the value of the marketable portfolio.

伯克希尔的股东可以放心，我们将永远把大部分资金投资于股票，主要是美国股票，尽管其中许多公司都有重要的国际业务。伯克希尔永远不会偏好持有现金等价资产，而放弃拥有优质企业，无论是全资控股还是部分持股。

Berkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority of their money in equities – mostly American equities although many of these will have international operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.

如果财政政策不当，纸币的价值可能会蒸发。在一些国家，这种鲁莽的做法已经习以为常，而在我们美国短暂的历史中，也曾经接近过这种边缘。固定息票债券无法抵御货币失控带来的风险。

Paper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this reckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country’s short history, the U.S. has come close to the edge. Fixed-coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency.

然而，只要企业的产品或服务受到国民的需求，企业以及拥有所需才能的个人通常都能找到应对货币不稳定的方法。个人技能也是如此。由于我缺乏诸如卓越的运动天赋、美妙的歌喉、医疗或法律技能等资产，在我的一生中，我不得不主要依靠股票投资。实际上，我一直依赖美国企业的成功，并且还会继续这样做。

Businesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way to cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country’s citizenry. So, too, with personal skills. Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful voice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities throughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will continue to do so.

无论如何，公民明智（更理想的是富有想象力）地配置储蓄，是推动社会不断增加所需商品和服务产出的必要条件。这种经济体系被称为资本主义。它有自身的缺陷和弊端（在某些方面，现在比以往任何时候都更加严重），但它也能创造出其他经济体系无法比拟的奇迹。

One way or another, the sensible – better yet imaginative – deployment of savings by citizens is required to propel an ever-growing societal output of desired goods and services. This system is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses – in certain respects more egregious now than ever – but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems.

美国就是最好的例子。自 1789 年美国宪法通过、国家活力得以释放以来，这个国家在仅仅 235 年的时间里取得的进步，即使是最乐观的殖民者也无法想象。

America is Exhibit A. Our country’s progress over its mere 235 years of existence could not have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution was adopted and the country’s energies were unleashed.

诚然，美国在建国初期有时会从国外借款以补充国内储蓄。但与此同时，我们需要许多美国人持续储蓄，然后需要这些储蓄者或其他美国人明智地配置这些资金。如果美国人把生产的所有东西都消费掉，这个国家就会原地踏步。

True, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own savings. But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed those savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had consumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels.

美国的发展历程并不总是一帆风顺的，我们国家一直有许多无赖和骗子，试图利用那些错误地将储蓄托付给他们的人。但即便存在这种不法行为（如今这种现象依然猖獗），以及由于激烈的竞争或颠覆性创新，许多资金配置最终失败，但美国人的储蓄还是带来了远超殖民者梦想的产出数量和质量。

The American process has not always been pretty – our country has forever had many scoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with their savings. But even with such malfeasance – which remains in full force today – and also much deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or disruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output beyond the dreams of any colonist.

从最初仅有 400 万人口，尽管早期还经历了一场残酷的内战，美国在转瞬之间改变了世界。

From a base of only four million people – and despite a brutal internal war early on, pitting one American against another – America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.

在某种程度上，伯克希尔的股东通过放弃股息，选择再投资而非消费，参与了美国的这一奇迹。最初，这种再投资微不足道，几乎可以忽略不计，但随着时间的推移，它如滚雪球般增长，这得益于持续的储蓄文化，以及长期复利的魔力。

In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by foregoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this reinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture of a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding.

伯克希尔的业务如今已遍布美国各个角落。而且我们并未就此满足。许多公司会因各种原因倒闭，但与人类不同的是，企业的老化本身并非致命因素。如今的伯克希尔比 1965 年时要年轻得多。

Berkshire’s activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished. Companies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal. Berkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965.

不过，正如查理和我一直承认的那样，伯克希尔如果换个地方，就不可能取得如今的成就，但即便伯克希尔从未存在，美国也依然会取得现在的成功。

However, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have achieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the success it has been if Berkshire had never existed.

所以，谢谢你，山姆大叔（美国的拟人化称呼）。有一天，伯克希尔的后辈们希望能向你缴纳比 2024 年更多的税款。请明智地使用这些钱。照顾好那些在生活中运气不佳的人们，这并非他们的过错，他们理应得到更好的生活。永远不要忘记，我们需要你维持稳定的货币，而这需要你具备智慧并保持警惕。

So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send you even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely. Take care of the many who, for no fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we need you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on your part.

财产意外险业务

Property-Casualty Insurance

财产意外险仍然是伯克希尔的核心业务。该行业遵循一种在大型企业中极为罕见的财务模式。

P/C insurance continues to be Berkshire’s core business. The industry follows a financial model that is rare – very rare – among giant businesses.

通常情况下，公司在销售产品或服务之前（或同时）会产生劳动力、材料、库存、厂房和设备等成本。因此，它们的首席执行官在销售产品之前就能很好地了解产品的成本。如果售价低于成本，管理者很快就会意识到问题。现金的大量流失是难以忽视的。

Customarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment, etc. before – or concurrently with – the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their CEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price is less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to ignore.

在承保财产意外险时，我们先收取保费，很久之后才会知道我们的产品成本是多少 —— 有时这个 “真相时刻” 会延迟 30 年甚至更久。（我们仍在为 50 多年前发生的石棉相关风险支付大量赔款。）

When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our product has cost us – sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years. (We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years ago.)

这种运营模式的好处是，在产生大部分费用之前，财产意外险公司就能获得现金，但也存在风险，即在首席执行官和董事们意识到发生了什么之前，公司可能已经在亏损，有时甚至是巨额亏损。

This mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P/C insurers cash before they incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing money – sometimes mountains of money – before the CEO and directors realize what is happening.

某些保险业务可以最大程度地减少这种时间差，比如农作物保险或冰雹损失保险，这些保险的损失能很快被报告、评估和赔付。然而，其他一些保险业务可能会让公司在走向破产的同时，还让高管和股东们沉浸在喜悦之中。想想医疗事故保险或产品责任险等。在 “长尾” 保险业务中，一家财产意外险公司可能会多年甚至数十年向所有者和监管机构报告大量但虚假的利润。如果首席执行官是个乐观主义者或骗子，这种会计处理方式可能会特别危险。这些情况并非凭空想象：历史上有大量这样的例子。

Certain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage in which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid. Other lines, however, can lead to executive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical malpractice or product liability. In “long-tail” lines, a P/C insurer may report large but fictitious profits to its owners and regulators for many years – even decades. The accounting can be particularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful: History reveals a large number of each species.

近几十年来，这种 “先收钱，后赔付” 的模式使伯克希尔能够投资大量资金（“浮存金”），同时总体上实现了我们认为的小额承保利润。我们对 “意外情况” 进行预估，到目前为止，这些预估是足够的。

In recent decades, this “money-up-front, loss-payments-later” model has allowed Berkshire to invest large sums (“float”) while generally delivering what we believe to be a small underwriting profit. We make estimates for “surprises” and, so far, these estimates have been sufficient.

我们不会被业务中不断增加的巨额赔付所吓倒。（在我写这封信时，想想野火造成的损失。）合理定价以承担这些损失，并在意外发生时冷静接受损失，这是我们的工作。我们还有责任对不合理的判决、无理的诉讼和公然的欺诈行为提出质疑。

We are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our activities. (As I write this, think wildfires.) It’s our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally take our lumps when surprises develop. It’s also our job to contest “runaway” verdicts, spurious litigation and outright fraudulent behavior.

此外，格雷格、我们的董事们和我个人在伯克希尔都有大量投资，这与我们获得的任何薪酬相比都要多得多。我们不使用期权或其他单边补偿形式；如果你们亏损，我们也会亏损。这种方式鼓励谨慎行事，但并不能确保我们有先见之明。

Under Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based company into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial strength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in relation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of compensation; if you lose money, so do we. This approach encourages caution but does not ensure foresight.

财产意外险业务的增长依赖于经济风险的增加。没有风险，就不需要保险。

P/C insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk – no need for insurance.

回想 135 年前，那时世界上还没有汽车、卡车或飞机。如今，仅美国就有 3 亿辆汽车，庞大的车队每天都造成巨大的破坏。飓风、龙卷风和野火造成的财产损失巨大，而且还在不断增加，其发生模式和最终成本越来越难以预测。

Think back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there are 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property damage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly unpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.

为这些风险提供 10 年期保单是愚蠢的，甚至可以说是疯狂的，但我们认为，一般来说，承担一年期的此类风险是可控的。如果我们改变主意，我们会改变提供的合同。在我有生之年，汽车保险公司通常已经放弃了一年期保单，转而采用六个月期保单。这种改变减少了浮存金，但有助于更明智地进行承保。

It would be foolish – make that madness – to write ten-year policies for these coverages, but we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our minds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally abandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float but allowed more intelligent underwriting.

没有任何一家私人保险公司愿意承担伯克希尔所能承受的风险规模。有时，这一优势非常重要。但当价格不合理时，我们也需要缩减业务。我们绝不能为了继续参与市场而承保定价过低的保单。这无异于企业自杀。

No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can provide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are inadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That policy is corporate suicide.

合理为财产意外险定价既需要艺术，也需要科学，而且绝对不适合乐观主义者。招募阿吉特的伯克希尔高管迈克・戈德堡说得好：“我们希望我们的承保人员每天上班时都保持警惕，但不要畏缩不前。”

Properly pricing P/C insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for optimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: “We want our underwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed.”

综合各方面因素，我们喜欢财产意外险业务。伯克希尔在财务和心理上都能从容应对极端损失。我们也不依赖再保险公司，这为我们带来了实质性且持久的成本优势。最后，我们拥有出色的管理人员（他们都不是乐观主义者），并且特别适合利用财产意外险业务带来的大量资金进行投资。

All things considered, we like the P/C insurance business. Berkshire can financially and psychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers and that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers (no optimists) and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P/C insurance delivers for investment.

在过去二十年里，我们的保险业务从承保中获得了 320 亿美元的税后利润，约为每美元销售额 3.3 美分的税后利润。与此同时，我们的浮存金从 460 亿美元增长到了 1710 亿美元。随着时间的推移，浮存金可能会略有增长，如果承保明智（再加上一些运气），浮存金有望实现零成本。

Over the past two decades, our insurance business has generated $32 billion of after-tax profits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our float has grown from $46 billion to $171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and, with intelligent underwriting (and some luck), has a reasonable prospect of being costless.

伯克希尔增加对日本的投资

Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments

我们投资重点虽在美国，但对日本的投资逐渐增加，这是一个虽小却重要的例外。

A small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in Japan.

自伯克希尔开始购买五家日本公司的股票以来，已过去近六年。这五家公司的运营模式与伯克希尔自身有相似之处，且都非常成功。按字母顺序，这五家公司分别是伊藤忠商事株式会社（ITOCHU）、丸红株式会社（Marubeni）、三菱商事株式会社（Mitsubishi）、三井物产株式会社（Mitsui）和住友商事株式会社（Sumitomo）。这些大型企业各自在众多业务领域拥有权益，许多业务立足日本，同时也有遍布全球的业务。

It’s been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese companies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself. The five are (alphabetically) ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Each of these large enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but others that operate throughout the world.

伯克希尔在 2019 年 7 月首次对这五家公司进行投资。我们简单查看了它们的财务记录，就对其股票的低价格感到惊讶。随着时间的推移，我们对这些公司的钦佩与日俱增。格雷格多次与他们会面，我也定期关注他们的进展。我们俩都欣赏他们的资本配置、管理层以及对待投资者的态度。

Berkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019. We simply looked at their financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have passed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times with them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their managements and their attitude in respect to their investors.

这五家公司都会在适当的时候增加股息，在合理的情况下回购股票，而且它们的高管薪酬计划比美国同行更为克制。

Each of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their shares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their compensation programs than their U.S. counterparts.

我们对这五家公司的持股是长期的，并且我们致力于支持它们的董事会。从一开始，我们也同意将伯克希尔对每家公司的持股比例保持在 10% 以下。不过，当我们接近这一限制时，这五家公司同意适度放宽上限。随着时间的推移，你可能会看到伯克希尔对这五家公司的持股比例都会有所增加。

Our holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting their boards of directors. From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire’s holdings below 10% of each company’s shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to moderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire’s ownership of all five increase somewhat.

截至年底，伯克希尔对这五家公司的总投资成本（以美元计）为 138 亿美元，持股的总市值达到 235 亿美元。

At yearend, Berkshire’s aggregate cost (in dollars) was $13.8 billion and the market value of our holdings totaled $23.5 billion.

与此同时，伯克希尔一直在（但并非依据任何公式）增加日元计价的借款。所有借款都是固定利率，没有 “浮动利率” 借款。格雷格和我对未来的外汇汇率没有看法，因此我们寻求近似货币中性的头寸。然而，根据通用会计准则（GAAP）的规定，我们必须定期在收益中确认所借日元的任何收益或损失。截至年底，由于美元走强，我们已计入 23 亿美元的税后收益，其中 8.5 亿美元是在 2024 年实现的。

Meanwhile, Berkshire has consistently – but not pursuant to any formula – increased its yen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no “floaters.” Greg and I have no view on future foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality. We are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation of any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included $2.3 billion of after-tax gains due to dollar strength of which $850 million occurred in 2024.

我预计格雷格和他未来的继任者将在未来几十年内继续持有这一日本投资头寸，并且伯克希尔未来还会找到其他方式与这五家公司进行富有成效的合作。

I expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for many decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five companies in the future.

我们也喜欢目前日元平衡策略的收益情况。在我写这封信时，预计 2025 年来自日本投资的年度股息收入总计约 8.12 亿美元，而我们日元计价债务的利息成本约为 1.35 亿美元。

We like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well. As I write this, the annual dividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about $812 million and the interest cost of our yen-denominated debt will be about $135 million.

奥马哈年度股东大会

The Annual Gathering in Omaha

我希望你能在 5 月 3 日来到奥马哈参加我们的股东大会。今年我们的日程安排略有变化，但基本内容保持不变。我们的目标是让你得到许多问题的答案，让你与朋友们相聚，并让你对奥马哈留下良好的印象。这座城市期待着你的到来。

I hope you will join us in Omaha on May 3rd. We are following a somewhat changed schedule this year, but the basics remain the same. Our goal is that you get many of your questions answered, that you connect with friends, and that you leave with a good impression of Omaha. The city looks forward to your visits.

我们将有一群热情的志愿者，为你提供各种各样的伯克希尔产品，让你在购物的同时也能收获快乐。和往常一样，我们将在周五中午至下午 5 点开放，有可爱的 Squishmallows 玩偶、Fruit of the Loom 的内衣、Brooks 跑鞋以及许多其他物品等你来选购。

We will have much the same group of volunteers to offer you a wide variety of Berkshire products that will lighten your wallet and brighten your day. As usual, we will be open on Friday from noon until 5 p.m. with lovable Squishmallows, underwear from Fruit of the Loom, Brooks running shoes and a host of other items to tempt you.

同样，我们今年只出售一本书。去年我们推出了《穷查理宝典》（Poor Charlie’s Almanack），全部售罄，周六营业结束前 5000 本就销售一空。

Again, we will have only one book for sale. Last year we featured Poor Charlie’s Almanack and sold out – 5,000 copies disappeared before the close of business on Saturday.

今年我们将推出《伯克希尔哈撒韦 60 年》（60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway）。2015 年，我请负责管理年会诸多事务的卡丽・索瓦（Carrie Sova）尝试编写一本关于伯克希尔的轻松历史书。我让她充分发挥想象力，她很快就创作出了一本书，其创意、内容和设计都让我惊叹不已。

This year we will offer 60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway. In 2015, I asked Carrie Sova, who among her many duties managed much of the activity at the annual meeting, to try her hand at putting together a light-hearted history of Berkshire. I gave her full reign to use her imagination, and she quickly produced a book that blew me away with its ingenuity, contents and design.

随后，卡丽离开伯克希尔去组建家庭，现在她有三个孩子。但每年夏天，伯克希尔的员工们都会聚在一起观看奥马哈风暴追逐者队（Omaha Storm Chasers）与美国职业棒球大联盟三级联盟对手的比赛。我会邀请一些老员工参加，卡丽通常也会带着家人一起来。在今年的活动中，我厚着脸皮问她是否愿意为伯克希尔成立 60 周年再出一版，重点展示查理的照片、语录和鲜为人知的故事。

Subsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each summer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play baseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with her family. At this year’s event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a 60th Anniversary issue, featuring Charlie’s photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.

即便要照顾三个年幼的孩子，卡丽还是立刻答应了。因此，我们将在周五下午以及周六上午 7 点至下午 4 点出售 5000 本新书。

Even with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said “yes.” Consequently, we will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.

卡丽拒绝为她在这本新 “查理” 版书籍上所做的大量工作收取任何报酬。我提议我和她共同签名 20 本书，捐赠给为奥马哈南部无家可归的成年人和儿童提供服务的斯蒂芬中心（Stephen Center），任何向该中心捐款 5000 美元的股东都可获得一本。基泽家族（Kizer family）从我的老朋友、卡丽的祖父老比尔・基泽（Bill Kizer, Sr.）开始，几十年来一直在支持这个有意义的机构。通过出售这 20 本签名书筹集的任何款项，我都会进行等额匹配捐赠。

Carrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new “Charlie” edition. I suggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing $5,000 to the Stephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family, beginning with Bill Kizer, Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie’s grandfather, have for decades been assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed books, I will match.

贝基・奎克（Becky Quick）将在周六报道我们经过重新安排的股东大会。贝基对伯克希尔了如指掌，她总是能安排与管理层、投资者、股东以及偶尔的名人进行有趣的访谈。她和她所在的 CNBC 团队在将我们的会议传播到全球以及存档大量与伯克希尔相关的资料方面做得非常出色。这一存档创意要归功于我们的董事史蒂夫・伯克（Steve Burke）。

Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky knows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers, investors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of both transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give our director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.

今年我们不会播放电影，而是会提前一点在上午 8 点开始会议。我会做一些开场发言，然后我们会立即进入问答环节，由贝基和现场观众轮流提问。

We will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will make a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions between Becky and the audience.

格雷格和阿吉特将和我一起回答问题，上午 10:30 我们会休息半小时。11 点重新开始时，只有格雷格会和我一起留在台上。今年我们将在下午 1 点结束会议，但展览区会一直开放到下午 4 点供大家购物。

Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at 10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.